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Abstract
This paper considers the security issue of the fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks with massive
connections, where multiple eavesdroppers aim to intercept the confidential messages through active
eavesdropping. To realize secure massive access, non-orthogonal channel estimation (NOCE) and non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) techniques are combined to enhance the signal quality at legitimate
users, while the inter-user interference is harnessed to deliberately confuse the eavesdroppers even
without exploiting artificial noise (AN). We first analyze the secrecy performance of the considered
secure massive access system and derive a closed-form expression for the ergodic secrecy rate. In
particular, we reveal the impact of some key system parameters on the ergodic secrecy rate via asymptotic
analysis with respect to a large number of antennas and a high transmit power at the base station (BS).
Then, to fully exploit the inter-user interference for security enhancement, we propose to optimize the
transmit powers in the stages of channel estimation and multiple access. Finally, extensive simulation
results validate the effectiveness of the proposed secure massive access scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing development of cellular internet-of-things (IoT), the fifth-generation (5G)
wireless networks are expected to support massive connections over limited radio spectrum
[1], [2]. Thus, it is required for 5G to adopt a novel multiple access technology to realize
spectral-efficient massive access. In this context, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), with
a great potential of improving the spectral efficiency and admitting a large number of users
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2simultaneously, has been widely recognized as a promising technology for 5G [3], [4]. On the
other hand, since a massive number of heterogeneous user equipments share the same spectrum,
wireless security becomes a critical issue of 5G due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels
[5]. As such, it is desired to design a secure massive NOMA scheme.
From an information-theoretic viewpoint, in order to improve the communication secrecy
performance, it is necessary to enhance the received signal quality at the legitimate users and to
reduce the signal leakage to the unintended users [6], [7]. Since the principle of NOMA is to
separate the users in the power domain, power allocation is naturally applied into NOMA to en-
hance the wireless security. In [8] and [9], power allocation schemes were designed for multiuser
secure NOMA systems from the perspectives of maximizing the secrecy rate and minimizing the
total power consumption, respectively. For the sake of reducing the computational complexity,
a fixed-proportion power allocation scheme was proposed in [10]. However, performing power
allocation only has a limited capability of security enhancement, since increasing the transmit
power may not only improve the signal quality at the legitimate user, but also at the eavesdropper.
To effectively improve the performance of physical layer security (PHY-security), a commonly
used approach is to equip with multiple antennas at the base station (BS) [11]–[13]. Then, by
performing spatial beamforming at the multiple-antenna BS based on the available channel state
information (CSI), it is possible to simultaneously increase the rate of the legitimate channel and
decrease the rate of the eavesdropping channel, and thus improve the secrecy rate [14]–[16]. For
instance, if the confidential signal is transmitted in the null space of the eavesdropping channel,
the eavesdropper is unable to receive any signal. Moreover, by making use of the spatial degrees
of freedom offered by the multiple antennas, artificial noise (AN) can be sent together with the
desired signal to confuse the eavesdropper [17], [18]. Thus, in the adverse case of short-distance
interception, the eavesdropper would suffer from a strong interference signal. However, in the
context of massive access, there might be not enough degrees of freedom for combating the
eavesdropping and transmitting the AN. To solve this problem, there are two feasible solutions.
First, the required spatial degrees of freedom for the transmission of the legitimate signals
can be effectively reduced via user clustering [19]. For example, the users are partitioned into
several clusters, and the users in a cluster share a beam [20], [21]. Second, massive multiple-
3input multiple-output (MIMO) can be applied to the NOMA systems to significantly increase the
available spatial degrees of freedom [22]. Especially, a BS equipped with a massive antenna array
can generate high-resolution spatial beams. Thereby, the signal leakage between the users can
be reduced significantly, resulting in a low inter-user interference [23] and a low eavesdropping
channel rate [24]. Moreover, there are more spatial degrees of freedom to send the AN to facilitate
communication secrecy provisioning [25], [26].
To exploit the benefits of massive MIMO for secure massive NOMA systems, the BS should
obtain accurate CSI of the downlink channels [27]. However, it is not a trivial task for the BS to
acquire accurate CSI in massive MIMO systems operated in frequency division duplex (FDD)
mode or time division duplex (TDD) mode. First, in FDD mode, the amount of CSI feedback
in massive MIMO systems is unbearable, since the number of required feedback bits should
increase linearly proportionally to the number of BS antennas for guaranteeing a given CSI
accuracy [28]. Thus, massive MIMO systems are usually suggested to operate in TDD mode.
Specifically, by exploiting channel reciprocity, the BS obtains CSI through channel estimation
based on the training sequences sent by the users over the uplink channels. However, in secure
massive NOMA systems based on TDD mode, there also exists several challenging issues in
CSI acquisition. On the one hand, the length of training sequence should be larger than the
number of users [29]. In the case of massive access, the required training sequence might be
longer than the duration of a channel coherence time, such that the estimated CSI has been
already outdated. To effectively reduce the length of training sequence, multiple users, e.g., the
users in a cluster for NOMA, should share the same training sequence. In other words, such a
non-orthogonal channel estimation method reduces the length of pilot sequence at the expense
of sacrificing the CSI accuracy. On the other hand, in secure communications, the eavesdroppers
may actively attack the channel estimation by transmitting the same training sequence as the
legitimate users [30], [31]. As a result, the CSI accuracy is further deteriorated. With inaccurate
CSI, the conventional secure communication schemes based on the AN are inapplicable, since
the AN may severely interfere with the legitimate users.
In the context of massive access, especially in the presence of active attacking from the
eavesdroppers, there are many challenging issues in the design of secure NOMA scheme. This
4is mainly because there is severe inter-user interference during the stages of CSI acquisition
and multiple access. The inter-user interference decreases the CSI accuracy and the quality of
the legitimate signal, resulting in a high probability of interception. However, the inter-user
interference also has a great impact on the quality of the eavesdropping signal. Specifically, the
inter-user interference can be harnessed and served as AN signal to confuse the eavesdroppers.
Inspired by that, this paper proposes to exploit the inter-user interference to enhance the secrecy
performance of secure massive NOMA systems. The contributions of this paper are three-fold:
1) We design a secure non-orthogonal transmission framework for 5G wireless networks with
massive connections, where the originally harmful inter-user interference is exploited to
enhance the communication secrecy performance.
2) We analyze the performance of the proposed secure massive NOMA system, and derive a
closed-form expression for the ergodic secrecy rate. Moreover, we reveal the relationship
between ergodic secrecy rate and various important system parameters via asymptotic
analysis.
3) We propose two optimization schemes for the design of channel estimation and multiple
access of secure massive NOMA systems, so as to fully exploit the benefits of inter-user
interference for security enhancement.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Section II designs a non-orthogonal transmission
framework for secure massive NOMA systems. Section III focuses on the analysis of the secrecy
performance of the secure massive NOMA system, and reveals the relationship between ergodic
secrecy rate and system parameters. Section IV proposes two power allocation schemes at the user
and the BS to fully exploit the inter-user interference. Section V presents extensive simulation
results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes, finally Section VI concludes the
whole paper.
Notations: We use bold upper (lower) letters to denote matrices (column vectors), (·)H to
denote conjugate transpose, E[·] to denote expectation, var(·) to denote the variance, ‖·‖ to denote
the L2-norm of a vector, ⊗ to denote the Kronecker product, vec(·) to denote the vectorization of
a matrix, | · | to denote the absolute value, χ2(N) to denote the χ2 distribution with N degrees of
freedom, and CN (x, y) to denote the complex Gaussian distribution with mean x and variance
5y.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
BS 
Eve1
Eve2
Eve3
Eve4
Fig. 1. A secure massive NOMA system with four clusters.
Consider a single-cell multiuser downlink communication system1, where a base station (BS)
equipped with Nt antennas broadcasts messages to K single-antenna user equipments (UEs),
cf. Fig. 1. Note that both the number of BS antennas Nt and the number of UEs K might be
very large in future 5G wireless networks. In other words, we consider a massive access cellular
system by making use of the massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technique. To
reduce the computational complexity, the K UEs are grouped into M clusters. In particular, the
UEs in the same direction but with distinct propagation distances based on their spatial directions
are partitioned into a cluster for exploiting the spatial degrees of freedom offered by the multiple-
antenna BS2. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that there are Nm UEs in the mth cluster.
In each cluster, we assume that there is an eavesdropper (Eve) intercepting the messages sent
to the UEs in that cluster. In particular, the Eve is or pretends to be a UE, thus we assume
that it is also equipped with a single antenna. For ease of notation, we use UEm,n and Evem to
denote the nth UE and the associated eavesdropper in the mth cluster, respectively. To guarantee
secure communication, PHY-security technique is applied to the massive access system. To fully
1The proposed schemes can be extended to the case of multiple-cell directly. We will discuss the multi-cell case in Section
III.
2The spatial direction of users can be found via various methods/technologies such as GPS or user location tracking algorithms.
6exploiting the benefits of multiple-antenna BS for enhancing the secrecy performance, the BS
should have partial CSI of the downlink channels. Thus, we first design a CSI acquisition method
which is suitable for massive access.
A. Non-Orthogonal Channel Estimation
Similar to most related works about massive MIMO systems, the considered system operates
in TDD mode for ease of CSI acquisition. To be specific, the UEs first send training sequences
over the uplink channels, and then the BS obtains the CSI of the uplink channels through
channel estimation. Due to the property of channel reciprocity in TDD mode, the CSI of
the uplink channels can be used as the CSI of the corresponding downlink channels. For the
traditional CSI acquisition methods, in order to guarantee accurate CSI, the training sequences
are designed with pairwise orthogonality. However, in the context of massive access, the length of
the training sequence might be longer than the channel coherence time for guaranteeing pairwise
orthogonality, resulting in outdated CSI. On the other hand, for eavesdropping more information,
the Eves may interfere with the channel estimation by transmitting the same training sequence
as the legitimate users. To simultaneously handle the two challenging issues, we propose a
non-orthogonal channel estimation method for secure massive access in the following.
At the beginning of each time slot, the UEs in the mth cluster simultaneously send a common
training sequence ΦHm with a length of τ symbols over the uplink channels, while the Evem
actively attacks the channel estimation through transmitting the same training sequence ΦHm as the
UEs. We note that although the training sequences in a cluster are the same, the training sequences
across the clusters are pairwise orthogonal, namely ΦHi Φj = 0, ∀i 6= j, and ΦHi Φi = 1. Hence,
the length of the training sequences is only required to be longer than the number of clusters
M , which usually can be realized in practical systems. Based on the non-orthogonal training
sequences, the received training signal at the BS can be expressed as
Y =
M∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
√
αj,iQj,iτhj,iΦ
H
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Legitimate training signal
+
M∑
j=1
√
βjUjτgjΦ
H
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attacking signal
+ N︸︷︷︸
AWGN
, (1)
7where αj,i and hj,i denote the path loss and the Nt-dimensional small-scale fading vector of the
channel from the UEj,i to the BS. Variables βj and gj are the path loss and the Nt-dimensional
small-scale fading vector from the Evej to the BS, respectively. It is assumed that αj,i and βj
remain constant during a relatively long time, while hj,i and gj independently fade over time slots
according to the distribution CN (0, INt). Moreover, Qj,i and Uj represent the transmit power of
the UEj,i and the Evej , and N is an Nt× τ additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) matrix with
zero mean and unit variance elements. Since the UEs in a cluster share the same pilot sequence,
we only need to estimate the effective CSI hj for the jth cluster, where j = 1, · · · ,M . Let us
focus on the estimation of hm as an example. First, right-multiplying Y by Φm, we have
YΦm =
Nm∑
i=1
√
αm,iQm,iτhm,i +
√
βmUmτgm +NΦm
=
√√√√Nm∑
i=0
αm,iQm,iτhm +NΦm, (2)
where hm =
Nm∑
n=0
√
αm,nQm,nτhm,n√
Nm∑
i=0
αm,iQm,iτ
is the effective CSI for the mth cluster in presence of the active
attacking signal from the Evem. Note that we let βm = αm,0, Um = Qm,0, and gm = hm,0 for
clarity of notation. Then, by using minimum mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation,
the estimated CSI hˆm at the BS is given by
hˆm =
√
Nm∑
n=0
αm,nQm,nτ
1 +
Nm∑
i=0
αm,iQm,iτ
yˆm, (3)
where
yˆm =
Nm∑
i=0
√
αm,iQm,iτhm,i + (Φm ⊗ INt)n, (4)
and n = vec(N). Combining (3) and (4), for the UEm,n, the relation between the actual CSI
hm,n and the estimated CSI hˆm can be expressed as
hm,n =
√
ρm,nhˆm +
√
1− ρm,nem,n, (5)
8where em,n is the channel estimation error vector with independently and identical distribution
(i.i.d.) zero mean and unit variance complex Gaussian distributed entries, and is independent
of hˆm. The variable ρm,n =
αm,nQm,nτ
1+
Nm∑
i=0
αm,iQm,iτ
(0 ≤ ρm,n ≤ 1, ∀m,n) is the correlation coefficient
between hm,n and hˆm. Specifically, a large ρm,n means a high CSI accuracy, which is affected
by the inter-user interference. Note that the effective CSI hˆm also contains partial information
of the eavesdropper channel gm, namely hm,0. If the Eves are passive, we have ρm,0 = 0. In
other words, the case of passive Eves is a special one of the considered model, and thus the
proposed schemes in the following is also applicable in the case of passive Eves.
Remark 1: Non-orthogonal channel estimation significantly shortens the length of training
sequences which facilitates CSI acquisition in the scenario of massive access. Meanwhile, the
proposed non-orthogonal channel estimation leads to the decrease of CSI accuracy, which is
similar to pilot contamination in multi-cell massive MIMO systems. However, the impact of
low accurate CSI caused by non-orthogonal channel estimation can be alleviated via successive
interference cancellation (SIC) at the UEs, but the interference due to pilot contamination is
difficult to be mitigated. In addition, non-orthogonal channel estimation decreases the number
of required training sequences in each cell, and thus it is possible to solve the problem of
pilot contamination due to pilot shortage. More importantly, it is able to fight against the active
attacking from the Eves by making use of inter-user interference during non-orthogonal channel
estimation. Especially, one can coordinate the transmit power Qm,n to further alleviate the
negative impact due to active attacking. Thereby, non-orthogonal channel estimation is more
appealing for secure massive NOMA systems.
B. Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
In order to support massive access over limited radio spectrum, the considered system also
adopts a non-orthogonal scheme based on user clustering during the stage of signal transmission.
Specifically, the BS first performs superposition coding to the signals of themth cluster as below:
xm =
Nm∑
n=1
√
Pm,nsm,n, (6)
9where sm,n and Pm,n are the Gaussian distributed signal with a unit norm and the corresponding
transmit power for the UEm,n, respectively. Then, the BS combines all clusters’ signals as follows:
x =
M∑
m=1
wmxm, (7)
where wm is an Nt-dimensional transmit beam designed for the mth cluster based on the ob-
tained CSI through non-orthogonal channel estimation. In this paper, we adopt a low-complexity
maximum ratio transmission (MRT) beamforming scheme3. For such a beamforming scheme,
wm can be expressed as
wm =
hˆm
‖hˆm‖
. (8)
Finally, the BS broadcasts the signal x over the downlink channels. Therefore, the received signal
at the UEm,n is given by
yom,n = α
1/2
m,nh
H
m,nx + nm,n
= α1/2m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,nsm,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Desired signal
+
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
α1/2m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,ism,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra-cluster interference
+
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
α1/2m,nh
H
m,nwj
√
Pj,isj,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter-cluster interference
+ nom,n︸︷︷︸
AWGN
, (9)
where nom,n is the AWGN with zero mean and unit variance. Note that the second term at the
right hand of (9) is the intra-cluster interference, which can be partially cancelled by using SIC
techniques at the UEs for enhancing the legitimate signal quality. Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that the effective channel gains related to the UEs in the mth cluster have a descending
order, namely
|α1/2m,1hHm,1wm|2 ≥ |α1/2m,2hHm,2wm|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |α1/2m,NmhHm,Nmwm|2. (10)
3MRT can achieve the asymptotically optimal performance as the number of BS antennas Nt approaches infinity [23].
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Each UE perfectly knows its effective channel gain through channel estimation, which is con-
veyed to the BS over the uplink links. Then, the BS obtains the order of effective channel gains
in each cluster and informs the UEs. As such, the UEm,n first decodes the signals of the UEm,i,
i ∈ [n+ 1, Nm], in the reverse order, then subtracts the intra-interference from these UEs in its
received signal yom,n, and finally demodulates its desired signal sm,n. In other words, the residual
intra-cluster interference is only from the UEs with stronger channel gains after SIC4. Thus,
for the UEm,n, the intra-cluster interference is reduced to
n−1∑
i=1
α
1/2
m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,ism,i, and its
received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) can be computed as
γom,n =
|hHm,nwm|2αm,nPm,n
|hHm,nwm|2αm,n
n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i +
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
|hHm,nwj |2αm,nPj,i + 1
. (11)
Meanwhile, the Eves also receive the signal from the BS. The eavesdropping signal related to
sm,n and the corresponding SINR at the Evem can be expressed as
yem,n = β
1/2
m g
H
mwm
√
Pm,nsm,n︸ ︷︷ ︸
Desired signal
+
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
β1/2m g
H
mwm
√
Pm,ism,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intra-cluster interference
+
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
β1/2m g
H
mwj
√
Pj,isj,i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inter-cluster interference
+ nem︸︷︷︸
AWGN
, (12)
and
γem,n =
|gHmwm|2βmPm,n
|gHmwm|2βm
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
Pm,i +
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
|gHmwj|2βmPj,i + 1
, (13)
where nem is the AWGN with zero mean and unit variance at the Evem. Note that the Eves
do not perform SIC within a cluster, since it is difficult for the Eves to know the ordering of
the effective channel gains, namely the reverse ordering of SIC. If the Eves Perform SIC with
an arbitrary ordering, the decoding error might be inevitable. Moreover, through exploiting the
4In Practice, due to channel estimation error, hardware limitation of the UEs, the low signal quality, and other factors, the
decoding error of the weak interfering signal may occur. As a result, there exists residual interference from the weak UEs after
SIC, namely imperfect SIC [32]. We will discuss the impact of imperfect SIC in Section III.
11
inter-user interference, it is possible to make the eavesdropping channel rate less than a given
threshold, which is not larger than the transmit rate of the confidential signals. In this case, if
the Eves try to perform SIC, the decoding error will also occur since the eavesdropping channel
rate is less than the transmit rate. In fact, if the Eves are capable of decoding the weak signals
for SIC, secure communication can not be realized for a ceratin UEs at least.
Remark 2: Due to non-orthogonal multiple access, inter-user interference exists inevitably,
resulting in a potential performance degradation. However, the originally harmful inter-user
interference can be used to confuse the Eves, and thus enhances the communication security. In
this paper, we aim to exploit the inter-user interference for balancing the interference to the UEs
and to the Eves, so as to improve the secrecy performance of secure massive NOMA systems.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE NOMA
In this section, we study the ergodic secrecy rate of secure massive NOMA communications
and reveal the impacts of inter-user interference caused by non-orthogonal channel estimation
and non-orthogonal multiple access. The results of this section shed lights on the optimization
of system parameters for enhancing the secrecy performance.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In general, the ergodic secrecy rate of the UEm,n can be computed as
Rsecm,n = E[(R
o
m,n −Rem,n)+], (14)
where Rom,n and R
e
m,n are the rates of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel
related to the UEm,n, respectively. In the case that the BS is equipped with a massive number
of antennas, the ergodic secrecy rate is lower bounded by [25]
R¯secm,n = (R¯
o
m,n − R¯em,n)+, (15)
where R¯om,n = E[R
o
m,n] and R¯
e
m,n = E[R
e
m,n] are the ergodic rates of the legitimate channel
and the eavesdropping channel, respectively. In other words, one can obtain a lower bound on
the ergodic secrecy rate by computing the achievable rate of the legitimate channel and the
12
eavesdropping channel. In what follows, we analyze the two ergodic rates in detail, respectively.
Firstly, according to the definition of the received SINR of the UEm,n in (11), the ergodic rate
of the legitimate channel can be expressed as
R¯om,n = E[log2(1 + γ
o
m,n)]. (16)
However, it is a nontrivial task to compute the expectation with respect to a complicated random
variable γom,n. To solve this challenge, we resort to an approximation of the ergodic rate of the
legitimate channel. To be more specific, we rewrite the after-SIC signal at the UEm,n as
yom,n = Im,n,0 + n
′
m,n, (17)
where Im,n,0 = E[α
1/2
m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,nsm,n] is the mean of the desired signal, and n
′
m,n is the
effective noise, which is given by
n
′
m,n =
3∑
t=1
Im,n,t + n
o
m,n, (18)
where Im,n,1 = α
1/2
m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,nsm,n − E[α1/2m,nhHm,nwm
√
Pm,nsm,n] is the signal leakage,
Im,n,2 =
n−1∑
i=1
α
1/2
m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,ism,i is the residual intra-cluster interference, and Im,n,3 =
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
α
1/2
m,nh
H
m,nwj
√
Pj,isj,i is the inter-cluster interference, respectively. If n
′
m,n is the AWGN
independent of Im,n,0 and the number of BS antennas is large, we can obtain an approximated
ergodic rate as [37]
R¯om,n ≈ log2(1 + γ˜m,n), (19)
where γ˜m,n =
φm,n,0
3∑
t=1
φm,n,t+1
is the effective SINR with
φm,n,0 = |Im,n,0|2, (20)
and
φm,n,t = E[|Im,n,t|2], t = 1, . . . , 3, (21)
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being the powers of the desired signal, the signal leakage, the intra-cluster interference, and the
inter-cluster interference, respectively. Thus, the derivation of the ergodic rate of the legitimate
channel is equivalent to the computation of expectations in (20) and (21). In what follows, we
compute these expectations in detail, respectively.
We first consider the term Im,n,0 for the computation of φm,n,0. Substituting wm =
hˆm
‖hˆm‖
and
hm,n =
√
ρm,nhˆm +
√
1− ρm,nem,n into Im,n,0, we have
Im,n,0 =
√
αm,nPm,nE[
√
ρm,nhˆ
H
mwm +
√
1− ρm,neHm,nwm] (22a)
=
√
αm,nPm,nρm,nE[hˆ
H
mwm] (22b)
=
√
αm,nPm,nρm,nE[‖hˆm‖] (22c)
=
√
αm,nPm,nρm,n
Γ(Nt +
1
2
)
Γ(Nt)
, (22d)
where Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function. Eq. (22b) follows the fact of E[eHm,nwm] = E[eHm,n]E[wm]
= 0, and Eq. (22d) holds true since ‖hˆm‖ has a scaled χ2(2Nt) distribution by a factor 12 .
Equivalently, we have E[‖hm‖] = Γ(Nt+
1
2
)
Γ(Nt)
. According to (22d), it is easy to obtain the power of
the desired signal as
φm,n,0 = αm,nPm,nρm,n
Γ2(Nt +
1
2
)
Γ2(Nt)
. (23)
Furthermore, if the number of BS antennas Nt is large, the power of the desired signal can be
approximated as
φm,n,0 ≈ αm,nPm,nρm,nNt, (24)
where Eq. (24) follows the fact of
Γ2(Nt+
1
2
)
Γ2(Nt)
→ Nt when Nt is large. It is seen that the CSI
accuracy ρm,n has a direct impact on the power of the desired signal.
Then, we analyze the power of the signal leakage, which can be computed as
φm,n,1 = E
[|Im,n,1|2] (25a)
= var
[
α1/2m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,nsm,n
]
(25b)
= E
[(
α1/2m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,n
)2]
− E2
[
α1/2m,nh
H
m,nwm
√
Pm,n
]
(25c)
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= αm,nPm,n
(
E
[|hHm,nwm|2]− E2 [hHm,nwm]) (25d)
= αm,nPm,n
(
E
[
|√ρm,nhˆHmwm|2
]
+ E
[|√1− ρm,neHm,nwm|2]− E2 [hHm,nwm]) (25e)
= αm,nPm,n
(
ρm,nNt + 1− ρm,n − ρm,n
Γ2(Nt +
1
2
)
Γ2(Nt)
)
, (25f)
where Eq. (25e) holds true since hˆm and em,n are independent of each other and Eq. (25f) follows
the facts of E
[
‖hˆm‖2
]
= Nt and E
[|eHm,nwm|2] = 1. Also, if the number of BS antennas is
sufficiently large, the term 1 − ρm,n in (25f) is negligible, such that the power of the signal
leakage can be approximated as
φm,n,1 ≈ 0. (26)
Intuitively, the signal leakage is caused by channel fading. However, the downlink channels
becomes deterministic due to channel hardening as Nt tends to infinity, and thus the power of
the signal leakage asymptotically approaches zero.
Similarly, it is easy to derive the powers of the residual intra-cluster interference and the
inter-cluster interference as
φm,n,2 = E
[|Im,n,2|2] (27a)
= αm,nE
[|hHm,nwm|2] n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i (27b)
= αm,n
(
E
[
|√ρm,nhˆHmwm|2
]
+ E
[|√1− ρm,neHm,nwm|2]) n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i (27c)
= αm,n (ρm,nNt + 1− ρm,n)
n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i (27d)
≈ αm,nρm,nNt
n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i, (27e)
and
φm,n,3 = E
[|Im,n,3|2] (28a)
=
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
αm,nPj,iE
[|hHm,nwj|2] (28b)
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= αm,n
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
Pj,i, (28c)
respectively, where Eq. (27b) and (28b) hold true since the signals sj,i are independent of each
other, Eq. (27c) follows the fact that hˆm and em,n are independent of each other, Eq. (27e)
neglects the term 1 − ρm,n, and Eq. (28c) is obtained because |hHm,nwj|2 has a scaled χ2(2)
distribution by a factor 1
2
. Substituting (24), (25f), (27e), and (28c) into (19), the ergodic rate of
the legitimate channel in secure massive NOMA systems can be expressed as
R¯om,n ≈ log2

1 + αm,nPm,nρm,nNt
αm,nρm,nNt
n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i + αm,n
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
Pj,i + 1

 . (29)
Now, we analyze the ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel, R¯em,n. It is noticed that the
Eve can be regarded as a special UE without performing SIC. Thus, similar to the derivation of
R¯om,n, R¯
e
m,n can be expressed as
R¯em,n = E[1 + γ
e
m,n]
≈ log2

1 + βmPm,nρm,0Nt
βmρm,0Nt
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
Pm,i + βm
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
Pj,i + 1

 . (30)
Note that if the Eves do not actively attack the channel estimation by transmitting the same
training sequence, they cannot receive any of the desired signal due to the fact ρm,0 = 0.
Moreover, if the Eves only send the interference signal independent of the training sequence, they
are also unable to intercept the message. This is because the massive antenna array can generate
high-resolution spatial beams to avoid the signal leakage to the unintended users. However,
massive MIMO systems operating in TDD mode is preferable, therefore it is vulnerable to
active eavesdropping during channel estimation.
Substituting (29) and (30) into (15), we can obtain a closed-form expression for a lower
bound on the ergodic secrecy rate R¯secm,n. It is found that R¯
sec
m,n is a function of the CSI accuracy
ρm,n and the transmit power Pm,n. The derived lower bound can be regarded as the case of
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channel hardening. Thus, when the number of BS antennas is sufficiently large, the lower bound
is tight. In fact, as seen in Fig. 2, even with a finite number of BS antennas, e.g., Nt = 64, the
lower bound is accurate. Notice that ρm,n is determined by non-orthogonal channel estimation,
and Pm,n is an important parameter for controlling the interference caused by non-orthogonal
multiple access. As such, it is possible to improve the secrecy performance by optimizing these
system parameters, which is equivalent to coordinating the inter-user interference to enhance
the communication secrecy. Moreover, it is seen that the number of BS antennas Nt also plays
an important role in the secrecy performance, since it simultaneously affects the rates of the
legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel.
Remark 3: The derived ergodic secrecy rate can be extended to the multi-cell case directly. In
the scenario of multi-cell, both the UEs and the Eves would suffer from the inter-cell interference
[33], [34]. Consequently, there exists the term of inter-cell interference in the denominators of
(29) and (30). Similar to the inter-cluster interference, the power of the inter-cell interference is
regardless of Nt, since the transmit beam is independent of the inter-cell interfering channels.
Remark 4: As aforementioned, SIC at the UEs might be performed imperfectly, resulting in
residual interference from the weaker UEs. In general, the residual interference can be modeled
as a linear function of the power of the interfering signal, and the coefficient of imperfect SIC can
be obtained by long-term measuring [35], [36]. Thus, the ergodic secrecy rate in the presence
of imperfect SIC can be directly derived by adding the term of residual interference in the
denominators of (29).
Remark 5: In this paper, we consider that the Eve is or pretends to be a UE. Thus, the BS
is able to obtain full information of the Eve, and derive the ergodic rate of the eavesdropping
channel in (30). However, if the BS has inexact information of channel parameters, e.g., βm and
ρm,0, there exist uncertainty about the ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel. Consequently,
the BS only has a possible range of the ergodic secrecy rate, but not an exact value.
B. Asymptotic Characteristics
To provide clear insights into the impacts of the three key parameters of secure massive
NOMA systems, namely Nt, ρm,n, and Pm,n, we carry out asymptotic analysis on the ergodic
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secrecy rate in two important scenarios.
1) A Massive Number of BS Antennas: We first reveal the impact of the number of BS antennas
Nt on the ergodic secrecy rate R¯
sec
m,n. As mentioned earlier, the BS in 5G wireless networks is
usually equipped with a large-scale antenna array, and thus the number of BS antennas might
be very large. As Nt approaches infinity, the inter-cluster interference and the received noise are
negligible compared to the intra-cluster interference. Thereby, the ergodic rates of the legitimate
channel and the eavesdropping channel can be approximated as
R¯om,n ≈ log2

1 + αm,nPm,nρm,nNt
αm,nρm,nNt
n−1∑
i=1
Pm,i


Nt→∞= log2

1 + Pm,nn−1∑
i=1
Pm,i

 , (31)
and
R¯em,n ≈ log2

1 + βmPm,nρm,0Nt
βmρm,0Nt
Nm∑
i=1
Pm,i


Nt→∞= log2

1 + Pm,nNm∑
i=1,i 6=n
Pm,i

 . (32)
In this scenario, the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate can be expressed as
R¯secm,n = log2

1 + Pm,nn−1∑
i=1
Pm,i

− log2

1 + Pm,nNm∑
i=1,i 6=n
Pm,i

 . (33)
It is found that there is a fixed gap between the rates of the legitimate channel and the eaves-
dropping channel, which is caused by the intra-cluster interference from the UEs with weaker
channel gains. In other words, the intra-cluster interference can be exploited to confuse the
eavesdropper, and thus improve the secrecy performance. As an illustrative example, one can
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increase the power of the weak user so as to increase the interference to the Eve, but does not
affect the received signal quality at the legitimate user.
Remark 6: A massive number of BS antennas hardens the communication channels and both the
inter-cluster interference and noise become negligible, resulting in the following phenomenons:
• The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is independent of the number of BS antennas, thus the
ergodic secrecy rate will be saturated when the number of BS antennas is sufficiently large.
• The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is independent of path loss and CSI accuracy, since
the signals in the same cluster experience the same channel gain.
• The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is independent of the BS transmit powers for the other
clusters’ signals, since the inter-cluster interference becomes asymptotically negligible.
2) A High Transmit Power: Then, we investigate the impact of BS transmit power on the
ergodic secrecy rate. For convenience of analysis, we let Pm,n = νm,nPtot, where Ptot is the total
transmit power at the BS and νm,n is a nonnegative power allocation factor related to the UEm,n
with a constraint
M∑
m=1
Nm∑
n=1
νm,n = 1. As Ptot approaches infinity, the noise power at the receiver
is negligible. Then, the ergodic rates of the legitimate channel and the eavesdropping channel
can be simplified as
R¯om,n ≈ log2

1 + αm,nPtotνm,nρm,nNt
αm,nρm,nNt
n−1∑
i=1
Ptotνm,i + αm,n
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
Ptotνj,i


Ptot→∞= log2

1 + νm,nρm,nNt
ρm,nNt
n−1∑
i=1
νm,i +
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
νj,i

 (34)
and
R¯em,n ≈ log2

1 + βmPtotνm,nρm,0Nt
βmρm,0Nt
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
Ptotνm,i + βm
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
Ptotνj,i


19
Ptot→∞= log2

1 + νm,nρm,0Nt
ρm,0Nt
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
νm,i +
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
νj,i

 , (35)
respectively. Thus, the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate in the scenario of a sufficiently high BS
transmit power is given by
R¯secm,n = log2

1 + νm,nρm,nNt
ρm,nNt
n−1∑
i=1
νm,i +
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
νj,i


− log2

1 + νm,nρm,0Nt
ρm,0Nt
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
νm,i +
M∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
νj,i

 . (36)
It is seen from (36) that the UEm,n and the Evem suffer the same inter-cluster interference, but
the desired signal and the intra-cluster interference are different. In particular, the desired signal
and the intra-cluster interference are functions of CSI accuracy and power allocation factors.
Therefore, one can improve the ergodic secrecy rate by optimizing these two parameters, namely
exploiting the inter-user interference during the stages of non-orthogonal channel estimation and
non-orthogonal multiple access.
Remark 7: In the high BS transmit power regime, we have the following observations:
• The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is independent of the BS transmit power, thus the
ergodic secrecy rate will be saturated when the BS transmit power is sufficiently large.
• The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is independent of path loss, since both the signal and
the inter-user interference experience the same channel gain.
• The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is independent of the BS power allocation for the other
clusters’ signals, since the inter-cluster interference is directly determined by the sum of
the signal powers of the other clusters.
Furthermore, if the number of BS antennas is also very large, the inter-cluster interference
is negligible. As a result, the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate is only determined by the power
allocation in a cluster. Hence, it makes sense to optimize the power allocation within a cluster
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for security enhancement. In what follows, we study the optimization of secrecy performance
by exploiting the inter-user interference.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION OF MASSIVE NOMA
An advantage of the proposed secure massive NOMA scheme is that the inter-user interference
can be leveraged to confuse the Eves, and thus enhance the secrecy performance. To fully exploit
the benefits of inter-user interference for security provisioning, it is desired to optimize the system
parameters according to channel conditions. In particular, the inter-user interference is determined
by non-orthogonal channel estimation and non-orthogonal multiple access, it is likely to optimize
these two important stages of secure massive NOMA systems. Inspired by that, we propose to
optimize these two stages from the perspectives of the maximization of the secrecy rate and the
minimization of the transmit power, respectively.
A. Exploiting Inter-User Interference in Non-Orthogonal Channel Estimation
As analyzed above, the Eves send the same training sequences as the legitimate users to
interfere with the channel estimation, resulting in the information leakage during the stage
of information transmission. According to (30), the amount of information leakage is directly
determined by the CSI accuracy of the eavesdropper channel. Since the CSI accuracy of the
eavesdropper channel is also affected by the training sequences of the UEs, it is possible to
coordinate the transmit powers of the UEs to combat the interception of the Eves.
1) The Maximization of Secrecy Rate: First, we optimize the non-orthogonal channel estima-
tion from the perspective of maximizing the secrecy rate. However, the secrecy rate, defined as
the difference of the legitimate channel rate and the eavesdropping channel rate, is in general
non-convex. To improve tractability of this problem, we transform it as the maximization of
the minimum legitimate channel rate subject to a constraint on the maximum eavesdropping
channel rate. This problem formulation ensures a rate gap to facilitate secure communication.
Furthermore, one can adjust the rate gap for meeting the requirements of various secure commu-
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nications. In this case, the optimization of non-orthogonal channel estimation can be described
as the following optimization problem:
OP1 :max
Q
min
m,n
R¯om,n
s.t. C1 : R¯em,n ≤ re,
C2 :Qm,n ≤ Qmaxm,n , ∀m,n, (37)
where Q is a collection of the transmit powers of the UEs for channel estimation, and Qmaxm,n is
the maximum transmit power of the UEm,n. Constant r
e is the maximum tolerable ergodic rate
achieved at the Eves, which is also used to ensure the rate of the eavesdropping channel less
than the transmit rate such that the Eves cannot perform SIC perfectly. To solve such a maxmin
problem, OP1 is first transformed as the following equivalent optimization problem
OP2 :max
Q,ro
ro
s.t. C1, C2,
C3 : R¯om,n ≥ ro, ∀m,n, (38)
where ro is a minimum ergodic rate of the UEs. According to the expression of R¯e in (30), C1
can be rewritten as
β2mPm,nNtτQm,0≤ (2re − 1)β2m
Nm∑
i=1,i 6=n
Pm,iNtτQm,0
+ (2re − 1)

βm Nm∑
j=1,j 6=m
Nj∑
i=1
Pj,i + 1

(1 + Nm∑
k=0
αm,kQm,kτ
)
. (39)
Note that (39) is a linear inequality of Qm,n. Similarly, C3 also can be transformed as a linear
inequality related to Qm,n. Thus, for a given r
o, OP2 becomes a standard linear programming
problem, which can be easily solved by some existing optimization softwares. Then, through a
one-dimensional search on ro, it is possible to obtain the optimal power control scheme about
Q. The algorithm for maximizing the secrecy rate by exploiting the inter-user interference in
non-orthogonal channel estimation is summarized as Algorithm 1 at the top of the next page.
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Algorithm 1 : Power control for maximizing the secrecy rate
Step 1: Initialize the parameters by letting ro = re;
Step 2: Solve the optimization problem OP2, and obtain Qm,n, ∀m,n;
Step 3: Update ro by letting ro = ro + ∆o, where ∆o is a small positive real number. If
OP2 is solvable, then go to Step 2.
Step 4: Output Qm,n, ∀m,n with the largest ro.
2) The Minimization of Total Power Consumption: Since the energy at the UE is limited, it
is desired to find the minimum power to achieve a given objective of ergodic secrecy rate. In
the case, the optimization problem can be formulated as
OP3 :min
Q
M∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
Qj,i
s.t. C1, C2, C3. (40)
As mentioned above, constraints C1 and C3 can be transformed as linear inequalities related to
Qm,n. Thus, OP3 is also a linear programming problem, and can be solved directly by using
some optimization softwares, e.g. CVX [38].
B. Exploiting Inter-User Interference in Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
It is noted that the inter-user interference in non-orthogonal channel estimation can only be
used to confuse the Eve in the same cluster, but the inter-user interference in non-orthogonal
multiple access affects all the Eves. Therefore, the optimization of non-orthogonal multiple access
is more beneficial to the enhancement of the secrecy performance. Similarly, we also exploit
the benefits of inter-user interference from the perspectives of maximizing the secrecy rate and
minimizing the total power consumption, respectively.
1) The Maximization of Secrecy Rate: To design a computation-efficient solution, we trans-
form the maximization of secrecy rate as the maximization of the legitimate channel rate subject
to a constraint on the eavesdropping channel rate. Thus, the optimization problem for maximizing
the secrecy rate by exploiting the inter-user interference in non-orthogonal multiple access can
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be formulated as
OP4 :max
P,ro
ro
s.t. C1, C3
C4 :
M∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
Pj,i ≤ Ptot
C5 :Pm,n ≤ Pm,n+1, ∀m,n, (41)
where P is the collection of the transmit powers of the BS for information transmission and C5
is imposed to facilitate SIC at the UEs. It is easy to rewrite C1 and C3 as linear inequalities of
the transmit powers of the BS Pm,n. Therefore, one can obtain the solution to OP4 for a given
ro. Through a one-dimension search on ro, it is possible to derive the optimal power allocation
scheme at the BS. In specific, the algorithm for maximizing the secrecy rate by exploiting the
inter-user interference in non-orthogonal multiple access can be summarized as
Algorithm 2 : Power allocation for maximizing the secrecy rate
Step 1: Initialize the parameters by letting ro = re;
Step 2: Solve the optimization problem OP4, and obtain Pm,n, ∀m,n;
Step 3: Update ro by letting ro = ro + ∆o, where ∆o is a small positive real number. If
OP4 is solvable, then go to Step 2.
Step 4: Output Pm,n, ∀m,n with the largest ro.
2) The Minimization of Total Power Consumption: Then, we also consider the optimization
of non-orthogonal multiple access from the perspective of minimizing the power consumption
at the BS. In this case, the power allocation can be described as the following optimization
problem:
OP5 :min
P
M∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
Pj,i
s.t. C1, C3, C4, C5. (42)
Note that C1 and C3 can be transformed as linear inequalities related to Pj,i, and C4 and C5
are linear constraints. Thus, OP5 is a linear programming problem, which can be easily solved
by some optimization softwares.
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The proposed algorithms are also applicable in the case of multiple-cell and imperfect SIC.
This is because the inter-cell interference in the multiple-cell scenario is equivalent to the inter-
cluster interference, and the residual interference caused by imperfect SIC is similar to the intra-
cluster interference. Moreover, in the presence of uncertainty about ergodic secrecy rate, the
proposed algorithms can be redesigned as robust ones by through a one-dimensional searching
over the uncertain region of the ergodic secrecy rate.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed secure massive NOMA scheme, we present
several simulation results in different scenarios. Without extra specification, we set Nt = 64,
M = 12, and Nm = 4, ∀m. It is assumed that all the UEs have the same maximum transmit
power for channel estimation. For convenience, we use PSNR to denote the ratio of the total
BS transmit power and the noise power (in dB), QSNR to denote the ratio of the maximum UE
transmit power and the noise power (in dB), and USNR to denote the ratio of the Eve transmit
power and the noise power (in dB), respectively.
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Fig. 2. The accuracy of theoretical analysis and performance comparison of NOMA and TMDA schemes.
Firstly, we check the accuracy of the derived theoretical expression for ergodic secrecy rate.
As seen in Fig. 2, the theoretical expression is a tight lower bound of the simulation results,
especially in the high PSNR regime. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show that
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with the increase of the PSNR, the ergodic secrecy rate first improves and then saturates when
the PSNR is sufficiently large. This is consistent with the asymptotic characteristics of a high
BS transmit power analyzed in Section III-B. Moreover, we compare the NOMA scheme and a
TDMA scheme in the sense of sum ergodic secrecy rate. Note that we assume that the TDMA
scheme has full CSI at the BS. However, it is found that the NOMA scheme achieves a superior
performance compared to the TDMA scheme in low and medium PSNR regions. This is because
each UE based on the TDMA scheme only occupies a small fraction of time duration, resulting
in a low spectral efficiency. At very high PSNR, the TDMA scheme performs slightly better
than the NOMA scheme. The reason that the interference is dominant at very high PSNR, but
the TDMA scheme is free of intra-cluster interference and inter-cluster interference. However,
the BS in general operates in low and medium PSNR regions. Therefore, the proposed NOMA
scheme can effectively guarantee secure communication of 5G wireless networks.
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Fig. 3. The effect of the number of BS antennas on the ergodic secrecy rate.
Secondly, we show the effect of the number of BS antennas on the sum of ergodic secrecy
rate, cf. Fig. 3. It is found that at low PSNR, as the number of BS antennas increases, the sum of
ergodic secrecy rate improves sharply. Thus, one can support secure massive access by simply
increasing the number of BS antennas, which is a major advantage of massive MIMO systems
with NOMA. As theoretically analyzed, the ergodic secrecy rate asymptotically approaches a
constant as the number of BS antennas increases. Especially, if both the number of BS antennas
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and the BS transmit powers are sufficiently large, the performance gain achieved by increasing
the BS transmit power is quite limited. This is because the ergodic secrecy rate is independent
of the BS transmit power under such a condition which reconfirms the theoretical analysis.
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Fig. 4. The impact of the Eve transmit power on the ergodic secrecy rate.
Thirdly, in Fig. 4, we investigate the impact of the Eve transmit power on the sum of the
ergodic secrecy rate for a given QSNR=-5 dB. It is intuitive that the sum of ergodic secrecy
rate decreases as the Eve transmit power increases, since the CSI accuracy of the legitimate
channel decreases. However, by exploiting the inter-user interference in non-orthogonal channel
estimation, the effect of the active attacking from the Eve is limited. As seen in Fig. 4, even
with a relative high attacking power, e.g., USNR=0 dB, the proposed scheme can achieve a high
ergodic secrecy rate. Especially, if USNR is not so high compared to QSNR, it is possible to
enhance the secrecy performance by adding more BS antennas, and thus alleviate the impact of
the active attacking from the Eve on the secrecy performance.
Then, we compare the sum of ergodic secrecy rates with different modes of user clustering.
In particular, for a given total number of the UEs, K = 48, the UEs can be partitioned into
different numbers of clusters. In this case, we consider three modes with 24, 16, and 12 clusters,
respectively. Note that we utilize the pilot sequences of fixed length for all modes. As shown
in Fig. 5, the sum of ergodic secrecy rate improves as the number of user clusters increases
(equivalently the number of UEs in a cluster decreases). This is because the CSI accuracy
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison with different modes of user clustering.
improves if the number of UEs in a cluster decreases. However, increasing the number of clusters
leads to longer training sequences. Moreover, a smaller number of UEs in a cluster is not capable
of supporting massive access. Thus, it is desired to select a proper mode to balance the sum of
ergodic secrecy rate and the length of the training sequence.
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Fig. 6. Performance comparison with different power control algorithms.
Next, we show the advantage of the proposed power control algorithm for exploiting the
benefits of inter-user interference at the stage of non-orthogonal channel estimation over an
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equal power control algorithm. To be specific, under the equal power control algorithm, all the
UEs use the same power to send the training sequences. As seen in Fig. 6, given the requirement
of ergodic secrecy rate, the proposed power minimization algorithm has a very low total power
consumption. Especially, as the required ergodic secrecy rate increases, the proposed algorithm
needs only a slight increment of the power, but the power consumption of the equal power
control algorithm increases sharply. This is because the UEs have different path loss and the
equal power control leads to a low power utilization efficiency. Thus, the proposed algorithm
can effectively exploit the benefits of inter-user interference with a small power consumption.
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Fig. 7. Performance comparison with different power allocation algorithms.
Finally, we compare the proposed ergodic secrecy rate maximization power allocation algo-
rithm with two baseline algorithms, namely a fixed-proportion power allocation algorithm and
an equal power allocation algorithm. As the name implies, the fixed-proportion power allocation
algorithm proposed in [10] allocates n
Nm∑
k=1
k
Ptot
M
to the UEm,n, and the equal power allocation
algorithm distributes the BS transmit power to all UEs equally. It is found in Fig. 7 that the
proposed algorithm performs the best in the whole PSNR region. Especially, as PSNR increases,
the performance gain with respect to the two baseline algorithms becomes larger. This is because
the proposed algorithm adaptively adjusts the power allocation according to channel conditions
and system parameters. Hence, at the stage of multiple access, the proposed algorithm also can
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effective exploit the benefits of inter-user interference to enhance the security of 5G wireless
networks with massive connections.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper addressed the security issue in 5G wireless networks with massive access by
exploiting the inter-user interference. We first designed a fully non-orthogonal communication
framework including channel estimation and multiple access according to the characteristics
of massive access. Then, we revealed the impact of inter-user interference on the secrecy
performance. Finally, we proposed two optimization schemes for channel estimation and multiple
access to fully exploit the benefits of inter-user interference for enhancing the security of 5G
wireless networks.
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